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Abstract
The paper explores the merit of the willingness-to-pay (WTP) method as a way to elicit public
preferences regarding health care priorities. The aim is to test the extent to which the implicit ranking
inferred from the ordinal differences in WTP-values corresponds with respondents’ explicit ranking
of the same programmes. This issue of convergent validity is explored by face-to-face interviewing of
population samples in six European countries—in total 1240 respondents. The most consistent result
is the inconsistency of WTP and explicit ranking in all six countries. The convergent validity of WTP
is low, particularly among those who did not state different WTP-values on the three programmes
being considered.
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1. Introduction
There are principally two different contexts in which the willingness-to-pay (WTP)-
method becomes useful for health care decision makers; to provide the benefit-measure in a
partial cost–benefit analysis wheno enew programme is considered, and; to compare the
relative values of alternative programmes whens veralprogrammes are competing for the
same resources within a fixed health care budget. This paper is concerned with the latter
context; in that, it explores the merit of the WTP-method as a way to elicit public preferences
regarding health care priorities.
In publicly financed health services, where health care managers lack fiscal discretion
to finance the programme in question by raising the revenues that people say they would
be prepared to pay, the cost–benefit motivation for obtaining WTP-values becomes futile.
Under such policy restrictions, the usefulness of the method lies in considering the differ-
ences in the obtained WTP-values as expressions of respondents’ preferred ordinal ranking
of alternative programme options.
While this way of inferringimplicit ranking based on differences in partially stated
WTP-values represents an indirect way of obtaining ranking preferences, a moreexplicit
way is to present the alternative programmes and ask the respondent to compare them and
give her preferred ranking of their importance. In theory, rational respondents would reveal
consistent rankings between the two methods, but do they?
The aim of this paper is to test the extent to which theimplicit ranking inferred from the
ordinal differences in WTP-values corresponds with respondents’xplicit ranking of the
same programmes. This is an issue of consistency, or a test ofconvergent validity, which
measures the degree to which concepts that should be related theoretically are interrelated
in reality.
One reason why this issue has not yet received much attention in the literature is that
nearly all applied WTP-studies in health care have been partial studies of one programme
in isolation (Olsen and Smith, 2001; Smith, 2003). An exception was a study of three
programmes that showed a substantial discrepancy between the explicit ranking and the
ranking implied from the partial WTP-values (Olsen and Donaldson, 1998; Olsen, 1997).
These findings raised doubts over the use of WTP in this health policy context. Thus,
further investigation of convergent validity was called for, and the EuroWill project was
established in part to address this issue (seeDonaldson, 1999andDonaldson and Shackley,
2003for a presentation of the project). Up to now, only single (and at most, double-) country
investigations of other important methodological issues addressed by EuroWill have been
published (Stewart et al., 2002; Protière et al., 2004; Ryan et al., 2004; Olsen et al., 2004a,b).
This note is the first to publish findings based on the population surveys in all six European
countries in which this project took place, addressing the convergent validity issue across
all of these countries.
2. Empirical evidence for convergent invalidity
The results reported below refer to representative population samples in which three
different health care programmes were presented in face-to-face interviews. Respondents
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were asked: “to rank the three programmes in terms of how important you think they are”.
After this,explicit ranking(ER) exercise, they were asked partial WTP-valuations of the
same programmes in the same order (independently of their earlier explicit ranking of the
programmes); firstly, asking if respondents would be willing to pay, and, if so, how much
was the maximum their household would be willing to contribute each year for each of the
programmes.
In accordance with microeconomic theory, we would expect consistency between the
ranking implied from WTP and their previously statedexplicit ranking. When a respondent
had ranked A before B, she would be expected to signal this preference by being willing to
sacrificemoremoney (i.e. higher WTP) in order to get A. Thus, we would hypothesise that
WTP shows convergent validity with explicit ranking.
The implied rankings from the WTP-answers depend on the level of differences in the
values provided. If three different WTP-values were given, it meansstrong ranking, i.e.
one programme was strictly preferred to a second that was strictly preferred to the third. If
two equal values and one different, there is aweak ranking, i.e. respondents preferred one
programme to the other two, between which they were indifferent, or, they were indifferent
to the first two, both of which were preferred to the third.No rankingsare of two kinds,
either three identical positive WTP-values or three zeros.
Table 1shows the numbers from each country. The first column shows the implied
rankings based on the WTP-answers, where the different degrees of ranking is referred
to asstrong, weak, andno. The subsequent columns show which degree of ranking the
respondents within each of these groups had stated on theexplicit rankingquestion. Thus,
each number in the WTP-column represents the corresponding row sum under ER. Com-
plete convergent validity would be revealed if numbers were seen in the diagonal only,
i.e. combinationstrong in WTP andstrong in ER; combinationweakin WTP andweak
in ER; combinationno in WTP andno in ER. As can be seen from the six country ta-
bles, the figures are concentrated in vertical lines understrong, particularly so for three
countries.
First, the only consistent group of respondents appears to be those who statedstrong
in WTP, where nearly all had statedstrongin ER. The inconsistency for the other groups
could be conceived of as a ‘weakening up’ of respondents’ willingness to rank between the
programmes as the preference elicitation exercise went from ER to WTP, in that there is a
shift towards the left of the diagonals inTable 1, i.e. lower degree of ranking from WTP-
responses. However, if we modify the complete convergent validity criterion of numbers in
the diagonals only, we note from the box combinations [(weakrow) and (strongcolumn)]
that many who should be expected to state three different WTP-values have still stated
two different values, i.e. they used WTP to discriminate between two rather than three
programmes.
Table 2summarises the results across the six countries. First, the (unweighted) coun-
try average shows that only 23% statedstrong rankings in their WTP-answers, while
73% had done so in their explicit ranking. Second, respondents are most reluctant to
rank the programmes through WTP; the country average showed that 41% were indif-
ferent to the three programmes. Third, an important type of inconsistency is the pro-
portion of respondents who stated indifference (no ranking) through WTP, but who in
the previous preference elicitation exercise had statedstrongranking. The reason for the
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Table 1
Comparing the degree of explicit ranking (strong, weak, no) with the degree of ranking as implied from WTP
WTP-ranking Explicit ranking
Strong Weak No Missing
Norway
Strong 51 48 3
Weak 39 34 5
No – posWTP 47 39 1 7
No – zeros 25 21 4
Total 162 142 1 19
Denmark
Strong 40 39 1
Weak 101 100 1
No – posWTP 83 78 1 2 2
No – zeros 87 75 1 11
Total 311 292 2 2 15
France
Strong 80 79 1
Weak 75 67 6 2
No – posWTP 45 41 1 3
No – zeros 101 86 11 4
Total 301 271 19 9
Portugal
Strong 63 54 7 2
Weak 92 71 16 5
No – posWTP 19 13 3 3
No – zeros 33 19 11 3
Total 207 157 37 13
Scotland
Strong 38 25 10 3
Weak 53 23 24 5 1
No – posWTP 52 14 16 22
No – zeros 3 2 1
Total 146 64 51 30 1
Ireland
Strong 15 11 3 1
Weak 34 21 6 7
No – posWTP 46 16 5 25
No – zeros 18 4 5 9
Total 113 52 19 42
lower proportion of inconsistent respondents in Scotland and Ireland can be ascribed to the
much smaller groups who had givenstrongin the initial explicit ranking exercise. Lastly,
the column ‘Convergent validity’ shows the percentages of respondents in the diagonals of
Table 1.
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Norway 31 88 44 1 83 30
Denmark 13 94 55 1 90 13
France 27 90 49 3 87 31
Portugal 30 76 25 6 62 37
Scotland 26 44 38 21 29 49
Ireland 13 46 57 37 31 45
Country average 23 73 41 11 64 34
The most notable differences between countries lie in the explicit rankings, in that the
Scottish and Irish were less prepared to discriminate. As compared with the other four
countries, there were relatively less respondents to state strong ranking, and relatively more
to state no ranking. Reasons for such inter country differences might reflect anything from
cultural factors (i.e.truepreferences differences) to differences in survey administration. It
might seem that the Irish respondents have a stronger aversion in general to rank health care
programmes. As for the Scottish survey, respondents were recruited in a shopping centre
rather than in their homes—something which might involve less focus in this cognitively
fairly demanding exercise; compare information in three health care programmes before
stating an ordinal ranking.
3. Discussion
Complete agreement cannot be expected between two different preference elicitation
techniques. Even in the relatively simplerexplicit rankingtechnique people make mistakes;
they misread or they rank in the wrong direction. However, such inaccuracies in the answers
stated on the underlying ER-yardstick were sought reduced by comparing three programmes
only, and by having this as the first exercise in the interview, when respondents presumably
had a fresh mind.
The most consistent result of these findings is the inconsistency of WTP and explicit
ranking in all six countries. The convergent validity of WTP is low, particularly among
those who did not state different WTP-values on the three programmes. When these results
became evident from the first country surveys, the EuroWill group decided to try a different
approach in Ireland. A so-called ‘incremental approach’ was developed (and used alongside
the standard approach reported from in this paper), whereby WTP was first asked for the
lowest ranked programme, followed by WTP being asked for the second ranked in terms of
how much more they would be willing to pay to have thatrather thantheir less preferred
option, with the same incremental procedure being followed for their first ranked option
(Shackley and Donaldson, 2002). However, this incremental version did not give a higher
proportion of consistent respondents when comparing explicit ranking with the ranking
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implied from WTP than the standard version did. One note of caution, though, is that
respondents in Ireland seemed to perform better than in most other countries in terms of
consistency in the standard version. Therefore, the scope for the incremental version to
improve things was less in that country.
The chosen yardstick against which the convergent validity of WTP was tested can
be criticised for its bias towards encouraging the respondents to make strong rankings,
although equal ranks were allowed. However, this is exactly the type of choices that decision
makers themselves are forced to make – and which, it is claimed, WTP assists them in
doing. Rather, the question is whether preferences expressed on this ER-yardstick can
be interpreted as reflecting the true underlying preferences – of relevance in this policy
context. The case for this would be that explicit ranking is cognitively relatively simple:
(i) it has a clear connotation toreal life in health policy, i.e. ‘resources are limited, and
one must prioritise between competing programmes’; (ii) the actual choice calls forordinal
rather than cardinal valuations; (iii) the valuation involves adirectcomparison of alternative
programmes, rather thanindirectvia one’s willingness to sacrifice own income. Three partial
money trade-offs are cognitively more difficult, in that it changes people’s frame of reference
to a choice between own income versus the existence of each of the described public
programmes.
While ER may force respondents to make priorities, it would be fairly easy – in theory
– to back up one’s preference ordering in the subsequent WTP-exercise by stating differ-
ent values. However, the majority of respondents ‘weakened up’ their rankings, when they
came to the WTP-exercise—despitethe interviewer made them aware of any inconsistencies
between the two approaches and also gave them the option of changing any such inconsis-
tencies. In the Norwegian survey, those respondents whose explicit ranking did not match
their implied ranking, and who thought that “surveys of this type should be used in the
health service to help set priorities”, were subsequently asked: “which of the two methods
would you like to be used?” The option “the one based on your ranking of the programmes”
received 75% support, while the option “the one implied by your WTP-values” received
19% support. The remaining 6% did not know. Hence, the vast majority of respondents con-
sider their answers to the explicit ranking exercise as the best reflection of their underlying
priority preferences.
The high proportions of respondents stating the same positive WTP-values on three
different programmes is a striking result, because there isno theoretical reason, a priori,
why consumers should be prepared to sacrifice exactly the same level of income for three
randomly selected goods. Thus, it seems like such respondents express a generally positive
attitudeto all programmes rather than well-behavedpreferences.
It is worth noting that such difficulties in obtaining well-behaved consistent preferences
are not restricted to WTP-surveys. Other preference elicitation methods used in economic
evaluations, e.g. conjoint analyses and the various health status valuation techniques, ap-
pear to have problems with consistency (see. e.g.Lloyd, 2003; Bleichrodt and Johannesson,
1997). The question that remains is which methods should we use to elicit people’s pref-
erences in priority setting contexts. The evidence presented in this paper poses serious
challenges for WTP in this respect. Whilst convergent validity remains a key issue, an im-
portant, and parallel strand of research would be to establish more rigorously why these
methods arrive at different results.
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